

Augusto Salazar Bondy's Philosophy of Value

Clark R. Donley

Forthcoming in *Comparative Metaethics: Neglected Perspectives on the Foundations of Morality* (New York: Routledge, 2020). Please cite that version.

Augusto Salazar Bondy was a major 20th-century Peruvian philosopher. During his relatively short life (1925–1974), he made significant contributions to phenomenology, the philosophy of domination and liberation, the philosophy of education, metaphilosophy, metaethics, and axiology.¹ He is described as “a true jewel of philosophical lucidity” (Navarro Reyes 2010, 9) and as a philosopher who “lived his philosophy to its ultimate consequences” (Miró Quesada [1974] 2015, 8).² Despite this, Salazar Bondy remains virtually unknown in Anglophone philosophy, and, where accounts of his work do exist, they have tended to skip over the gravitational center of his work: his philosophy of value.³ This limited engagement with Salazar Bondy's work is unfortunate for two reasons. First, Salazar Bondy made signifi-

¹For biographical details, see Arpini (2016, ch. 1), Sobrevilla (1995), and Ørvig (1995).

²Helen Ørvig (1995, 14), his wife, recalls that, even when he was physically unable to write due to illness in 1974, he would dictate his work “paragraph by paragraph” every day until a week before his death.

³For a helpful account of Salazar Bondy's metaphilosophy in relation to his philosophy of domination, see Schutte (1993, chap. 3).

cant and nuanced contributions to the philosophy of value that deserve careful study. Second, by understanding Salazar Bondy's philosophy of value, we can better understand his treatment of topics such as Latin American metaphilosophy and the philosophy of domination and liberation. In this chapter I provide a detailed introduction to and reconstruction of Salazar Bondy's philosophy of value and its development.

Salazar Bondy's overarching philosophical project, as David Sobrevilla (1995, 17) observes, is integrating phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and humanist socialism. These three influences roughly correspond to what Adriana María Arpini identifies as the three stages of Salazar Bondy's philosophical development (Arpini 2008, 2016, chaps. 1–2). In the first period (1950s—early 1960s), he adopts the 'phenomenological-ontological' approach. In the second period (early 1960s–1970), his primary focus is analytic metaethics and the philosophy of value. There was a significant methodological change between the first and second periods from phenomenology to analytic philosophy. In the third period (1970–1974), Salazar Bondy focuses more on issues of domination, liberation, education, and the role of philosophy in relation to those, likely owing to his increased political involvement as an active education reformer in government.⁴ Unlike the significant change in

⁴Salazar Bondy was politically active throughout his career. Salazar Bondy's political views should be seen in the context of Latin American history, with its legacy of colonialism and imperialism, and the corresponding ills of poverty, inequality, domination, racism, and sexism. Salazar Bondy's adult years were periods of political tumult in Peru. In 1948, there was a military coup; in 1956, there were elections, at which time Salazar Bondy was the cofounder of the humanist socialist *Movimiento Social Progresista*, a group of public intellectuals who agitated for social reforms. From 1963–1968, there was the tumultuous Belaúnde presidency, including peasant uprisings and their suppression. Although political

philosophical frameworks between the first two periods, here we mainly see a shift in the subject matter emphasized. Although his emphasis changed, he aspired to integrate his later views with his earlier work on the philosophy of value. His essays on the philosophy of value across much of his career are collected in his *Para una filosofía del valor* (published in 1971 and republished in 2010; my citations to these essays refer to the 2010 edition and are abbreviated as *PFV*). Sadly, Salazar Bondy died prematurely at the age of 48 on February 6, 1974, and we cannot know exactly how he would have completed his philosophical project had he lived longer.

This chapter has three parts corresponding to the three stages of the development of Salazar Bondy's philosophy. In the first part, I provide an account of Salazar Bondy's early philosophy of value based on the fulfillment of being (*cumplimiento del ser*) and his later objections to it. In the second part I offer an account of his analytic turn and his mature philosophy of value. Here Salazar Bondy begins to think about value as a "condition of the possibility of human action" (*PFV*, 204). There will be three steps to this. First, I will explain Salazar Bondy's mature philosophical framework: the critical-transcendental point of view. Value, on this view, is transcendental because it makes intelligible "an order of human actions and interactions" (*PFV*, 179). Second, I will discuss Salazar Bondy's account of the evaluative demand and its role in his analysis of *good*. As Salazar Bondy says in "Una hipótesis sobre

concerns are rarely explicit in his philosophy of value from the first two periods, they do become important for understanding how, around the early 1970s, he attempts to integrate his philosophy of value with his philosophy of domination and liberation. In 1968, there was a revolutionary military coup (led by General Juan Velasco Alvarado), which remained in power from 1968 to 1980. This regime sought to implement populist reforms, including educational reforms. Salazar Bondy agreed to help lead the commission on educational reforms in the early 1970s.

el sentido valorativo” (1965), “to value is not in essence to describe, nor to prove objectivities, nor is it to report, express, provoke, or prescribe states of mind, but to recognize and communicate a demand of acceptance or rejection, agreement or disagreement, that transcends the factual” (*PFV*, 120). The nucleus of this demand is a primitive, irreducibly normative *ought* (*debe*)—namely, the demand that one *ought* to have a favorable attitude toward that which is valuable—and this *ought* is the basis for Salazar Bondy’s analysis of *good*. The last part of Salazar Bondy’s mature philosophy that I will discuss is his account of the experience of value, including the different modes and patterns of valuation. In the third and final section of this chapter I will show how Salazar Bondy’s mature philosophy of value connects to and illuminates his views on Latin American metaphilosophy and the philosophy of domination and liberation.

1 Salazar Bondy’s Early Philosophy of Value

In Salazar Bondy’s early work, he presents a phenomenological-ontological account of value. He argues that we should understand value as the ‘fulfillment of being’ (*cumplimiento del ser*), and that, by paying attention to *cumplimiento del ser* and its different modes, we can establish a hierarchy of value and the valuable.

1.1 Axiological Hierarchy and *Cumplimiento del Ser*

To understand his early philosophy of value, it will be helpful to very briefly introduce his phenomenology of ontology during this period. In *Irrealidad e idealidad* (1958;

cited as *II*), Salazar Bondy aims to show that a strict distinction between ideality and irreality (according to which ideal objects—such as Platonic forms or universals—have ontological independence, transcendence, and can be known indubitably, whereas irreal objects—such as artistic conceptions, political ideals, and so on—lack these features) is not tenable. Although there is not space here to unpack his dense argumentation for this thesis, his goal is to “unify both kinds of entities, showing the identity of their fundamental objective structure and of their behavior with respect to knowledge” (*II*, 14).

Axiological issues, Salazar Bondy notes, had often been approached from the perspective of ideality, including an “explicit identification of values with ideal entities” (*II*, 142). While Salazar Bondy thinks that it’s important to retain some aspects of ideality for value (e.g., transcendence), he notes that value often acts more like irreal objects (such as aesthetic creations or political ideals). With the unification of irrealty and ideality, Salazar Bondy hopes that he can explain both of these aspects of value. Values have an ideal possibility and transcendence, but that transcendence, as Arpini glosses it, is “toward a concrete correlate, by reference to which it grounds its completion on another level” (2016, 60). For example, take the value of beauty in an artwork: beauty provides an ideal possibility that transcends any given concrete work of art, but it is our contemplation of the concrete work of art as beautiful that fulfills or completes that aesthetic object’s value as the beautiful object that it is for us.⁵ Here Salazar Bondy combines aspects of ideality (transcendence)

⁵For more on Salazar Bondy’s aesthetic views, see “Valor y objeto en estética” (1959; *PFV*, essay 12).

and irreality (the intentional act of contemplation) to explain the value of a beautiful work of art in its ontological completion.

In “La jerarquía axiológica” (1959; *PFV*, essay 11), Salazar Bondy systematically develops this theory of value as *cumplimiento del ser*. According to this view, value is not “an instance with its own ontic content” nor is it something “independent of valuable entities,” but, rather, value belongs to the “ontological completion” of entities according to “the constitution proper to them” (*PFV*, 205). To establish a hierarchy of value, notes Salazar Bondy, we need, first, criteria for ordering the entities themselves according to their superiority or inferiority, and, second, criteria for ordering the modes of fulfillment of being. The unification of these, he hopes, can create a universal hierarchy of value.

Salazar Bondy begins by considering a hierarchy of value with respect to a singular object. There are three dialectical moments of ‘axiological transcendence’ (*trascender axiológico*) here. The first moment is when the entity is real but lacking in its development. Even an incomplete entity can be valuable by virtue of “the positivity of its realization” (*PFV*, 208). The second moment is the ideality of that entity, understood as the potentialities of its development. The third moment is the realization of the ideality of the entity, which is the “full plenitude” of that entity (*PFV*, 208).⁶ An entity that realizes this full plenitude is more valuable than an entity of the same kind that does not. Consider, for example, a piece of fruit in its different temporal stages. We experience the mature, ripe stage of that fruit as more valuable than the immature, unripe stage of fruit, Salazar Bondy says, insofar as the

⁶For additional complexities, see *PFV*, 208–13.

fruit *qua* fruit has more completely fulfilled its being in its mature stage. We may also consider other objects of a similar class, such as when picking out one apple from a bushel, and here we can apply the previous criterion of *cumplimiento del ser* to each member of the set and then establish an ordering of that set.

We can also consider *cumplimiento del ser* in relation to us. Here Salazar Bondy introduces hierarchical orderings based on a “fulfillment of a being-for” (*cumplimiento de un ser-para*) (PFV, 213). For example, when we judge that a sharp knife is better than a dull knife, we appeal to the function of knives and their fulfillment of being for us. We can also do this for entities that are not functionally defined. From our perspective, we value tasty fruit more than non-tasty fruit, and when we consider a piece of fruit this way we treat it not as an object in itself but in relation to us. With this “oblique” perspective, the original object loses its “ontological autonomy” insofar as we characterize its being as *incorporated* into the subject (PFV, 211–12). At this level, the subject-object pair can be considered as another object and ranked according to the fulfillment of its own being. For example, consider a chef who values dull knives (perhaps mistakenly considering them safer than sharp knives) and whose ability to be a good chef suffers as a result. A value hierarchy where dull knives are subjectively preferred is worse than one where sharp knives are preferred because dull knives do not allow a chef to be as good as the chef with sharp knives—i.e., for the chef to fulfill their being as a chef.

Salazar Bondy thinks that we can generalize this insight to establish a universal ranking of value and the valuable. He notes that there are three different modes or levels of valuation. The first level consists of those “values that any entity considered

in itself can possess,” as seen earlier (*PFV*, 215). On the second level, there are values that are constituted by the human being’s *cumplimiento del ser*. Here one finds first-order kinds of value, such as hedonistic, economic, theoretical, political, social, and ethical values (*PFV*, 216). Salazar Bondy thinks that we can rank these kinds of values according to the degree to which they constitute the *cumplimiento del ser* of the human being. For example, Salazar Bondy says, “hedonistic [values] occupy a place inferior to theoretical ones” because pleasure has less “ontic wealth” insofar as knowledge of the world opens “the horizon of being” to humans (*PFV*, 217). (Here again, we see Salazar Bondy’s debts to phenomenology.) For Salazar Bondy, ethical values here occupy the highest rank as they constitute the perfection of human beings (*PFV*, 216). Those who prize the value of pleasure over the value of ethics are, as human beings, much like the dull-knifed chef earlier: they are not able to fulfill their being as the kind of entity that they are. Beyond this, there is another level: universality, which takes into account both human and other values and whose hierarchy is ordered according to the fulfillment of being *as such*. For Salazar Bondy, the human level finds its own *completion* at the universal level (*PFV*, 217). Salazar Bondy thinks that we can establish a unified, monistic theory of value here. Although the details are sketchy, Salazar Bondy says that the universal level of valuation involves “the metaphysical transcendence” whose apex is “absolute value” and the “absolute fulfillment of being” (*PFV*, 218).

1.2 The Transition Away From His Early Theory of Value

Salazar Bondy comes to reject much of this account of value later in his career. Nonetheless, his reasons for rejecting it help to clarify his shift toward his mature philosophy of value. In addition, while there are major changes from his early to his mature philosophy of value, there are nonetheless important thematic continuities.

In the version of “La jerarquía axiológica” republished in *Para una filosofía del valor* ([1971] 2010), Salazar Bondy offers multiple objections to his early philosophy of value (PFV, 205n1). First, he argued that his early theory of value committed the reductionist fallacy (or, in G.E. Moore’s original term, the *naturalistic fallacy*). For Moore, one way of committing the naturalistic fallacy is to illicitly identify some *G* (e.g., *good*) with a natural or metaphysical property. Although *cumplimiento del ser* may be a kind of good (or value), this did not entitle Salazar Bondy to *identify cumplimiento del ser* with good or value itself, and so, he thinks, this early account of value commits the reductionist fallacy. Second, he holds that his early view falls to Hume’s guillotine (i.e., the *is-ought* gap). In “Razón y valor” (1968; PFV, essay 8), Salazar Bondy criticizes what he calls *ontologism* in the philosophy of value, by which he means “any thesis on which the foundation of value appeals to the structure of being or to the order of nature as the ultimate *ratio* of all assessment” (PFV, 177). Ontologism, he claims, succumbs to Hume’s guillotine because it “implies an invalid move from indicative to evaluative discourse” (PFV, 177). In Salazar Bondy’s eyes, his *cumplimiento del ser* view of value does exactly that: it offers an analysis of what an object *is* and illicitly moves directly to value (i.e., what it *ought* to be).

A further objection that Salazar Bondy makes against his earlier theory is that

the vague and overwrought metaphysical nature of his early system would land us in a “whirlwind of aporias” (PFV, 205–6n1). For example, we can consider the baroque complexity of the different modes of *cumplimiento del ser* and of the ranking the different kinds of value (e.g., the value of pleasure vs. the value of knowledge or ethics, as mentioned previously), as well as the obscurity of ‘metaphysical transcendence’ or ‘absolute fulfillment of being’. This was sure, he thought, to result in a variety of confusions and “pseudo-problems” (PFV, 205–6n1).

Despite these concerns, there are some thematic continuities from Salazar Bondy’s early work to his mature work. First, he continues to be concerned with our *experience* of value. Second, he continues to reject robustly realist interpretations of value according to which value is a kind of entity or substantial property. Third, he continues to emphasize transcendence, although his account of transcendence changes significantly.

2 Salazar Bondy’s Mature Philosophy of Value

What separates Salazar Bondy’s early philosophy of value from his mature philosophy of value is his *analytic turn*. In the early 1960s, Salazar Bondy began a detailed engagement with analytic philosophy, especially early Wittgenstein and analytic metaethics. This engagement caused him to develop a new and rich philosophy of value. I will explain his mature philosophy of value in three parts. First, I will discuss his overarching framework: the critical-transcendental point of view. Second, I will discuss his account of the evaluative demand and how he analyzes *good* on the basis

of it. Third, I will discuss his account of the experience of value in its different modes (attribution, realization, preference, and choice) and how this relates to patterns of valuation.

2.1 The Critical-Transcendental Point of View

The overarching framework for Salazar Bondy's mature philosophy of value is the *critical-transcendental point of view*. Value here is not *in* the world but instead is what makes the world of rational human action *possible*. Salazar Bondy calls his move toward the critical-transcendental point of view his "Copernican turn to the problem of the grounding of value" (*PFV*, 178).

Salazar Bondy's critical-transcendental point of view is deeply influenced by Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (*T*).⁷ In "El problema del valor en el primer Wittgenstein" (1965; *PFV*, essay 15), Salazar Bondy closely reads several *Tractatus* passages on value and ethics (6.4–6.421). Here we find him sketching out some of the basic commitments of his critical-transcendental point of view for the first time. We can identify three main points from Salazar Bondy's line-by-line interpretation of these passages that are especially important.⁸

First: "[I]n [the world] no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value" (*T*, 6.41). Salazar Bondy sees two lines of argument for this from Wittgenstein (*PFV*,

⁷Thanks to Quentin Fisher for helpful feedback here. Translations of the *Tractatus* in this section are by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness.

⁸Because Salazar Bondy's reading of Wittgenstein has, as Navarro Reyes (2010, 18) puts it, a "finesse" that makes it "a superb example of conceptual precision," it is impossible to do it full justice here, but, nonetheless, it is useful to at least sketch its major contours.

264–6). The first concerns the nature of value in relation to facts. For Wittgenstein, “The world is the totality of facts” (*T*, 1.1). If so, then, if value were in the world, it would be a fact (or set of facts), but, if value were a fact then it would cease to function as a *value* (*PFV*, 264). Because this is implausible, values cannot be *in* the world. Second, “all that happens and is the case is accidental” (*T*, 6.41), but because value is non-accidental and necessary it cannot be in the world (*PFV*, 266).

Second: “[I]t is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics” (*T*, 6.42) and “ethics cannot be put into words” (*T*, 6.421). Wittgenstein holds this view, on Salazar Bondy’s reading because “to say something is to say it in terms of facts” and because facts are in the world and value is not, one cannot have propositions of ethics (*PFV*, 266). It would be a mistake, Salazar Bondy says, to think that this “nullifies ethics” for Wittgenstein (*PFV*, 267). Although we cannot *say* something ethical with words, our language can *show* something ethical. As we will see, for Salazar Bondy, evaluative language shows our commitment to an evaluative demand. However, although Salazar Bondy thinks that Wittgenstein is correct about evaluative language, he also holds that we can learn a lot through the analysis of our ordinary value language. For example, in “La experiencia del valor” (1967; *PFV*, essay 1), Salazar Bondy mimics Wittgenstein’s terse style in the *Tractatus* while talking extensively about evaluative language. Given Wittgenstein’s points here, this is, as Navarro Reyes (2010, 18) remarks, “a sincere homage and an irreverent gibe” toward Wittgenstein.

Third: “Ethics is transcendental” (*T*, 6.421; *PFV*, 267–9). Salazar Bondy connects this claim to Wittgenstein’s claim in 6.13 that ‘logic is transcendental’. On Salazar Bondy’s reading of Wittgenstein, logic is *a priori*, does not describe the world, and

does not deal with facts, and so logical propositions “have no meaning (they are *sinnlos*) but they are not meaningless (*unsinnig*)” (PFV, 267–8). Logic and logical propositions “expose the structure of the world” by reflecting it (T, 6.13). This reflection is unsayable, but it has “the function of exhibiting the essence of the world” (PFV, 267–8). This is what it means, on Salazar Bondy’s reading, for logic to be *transcendental*. Because ethics (and value more generally) is transcendental, it has similar characteristics: it is *a priori*, it does not describe facts of the world, it is devoid of meaning but not meaningless, and it is unsayable while showing something (PFV, 268). One difference between logic and ethics is that logic is involved in all propositions, which are, as Salazar Bondy puts it, “a logical image of the facts” (PFV, 267). But this can’t be the function of ethics. Here Salazar Bondy observes that we can make sense of this through the ethical will. For Wittgenstein, “the world is independent of my will” (6.373) and “there is no logical connection between the will and the world” (6.374). Because the good or bad will can change independent of the world, Salazar Bondy says, the will—and hence ethics—has a transcendental character with respect to the world (PFV, 269).

In “Razón y valor” (1968; PFV, essay 8), Salazar Bondy offers his own elaboration of the critical-transcendental point of view and builds on his interpretation of Wittgenstein. According to this view, value is transcendental in the sense that it is a category “thanks to which there is a rational world, an order of actions and interactions that we can understand” (PFV, 179). It will be helpful here to expand on three aspects of this view: action, understanding and rationality, and objectivity.

Like Wittgenstein, Salazar Bondy draws a parallel between the transcendentals

of logic and value. Those of logic are, says Salazar Bondy, what make possible “objects in general” and those of value are what make possible “objects of praxis” (PFV, 179–80). By “objects of praxis,” Salazar Bondy means actions, the ends of action, choices, and so on. Why does Salazar Bondy think that value makes possible objects of praxis? Consider what setting a practical goal involves: one must, Salazar Bondy says, both accept something as a goal and discard competing possibilities—that is, one must make a *choice* and thereby make a comparative judgment about the *value* of what is chosen (PFV, 191). This is more than a purely subjective judgment of value. To make such a choice, Salazar Bondy says, we have to recognize a value that makes an end intelligible as an end for us. This requires making or recognizing a demand to adopt a favorable attitude toward that thing and to have a contrary attitude toward the discarded possibilities one (PFV, 246–7). This demand implies that the judgment aims to be “valid for all subjects” that would be similarly situated (PFV, 123). Thus whenever I set a practical goal I make a judgment that transcends my (and others’) subjectivity and that presupposes a certain shared objectivity in the social world (PFV, 247). Value, then, functions as a term of action and, in doing so, aims to be “shareable as a collective task and as a public reality” (PFV, 247). Value renders objects of praxis—ends, choices, actions—intelligible but isn’t itself an object of praxis and so is transcendental. It’s important for Salazar Bondy that we can *rationally* understand our actions and interactions thanks to value. When one person makes an evaluative demand, that person presupposes that those subject to the demand can understand it. This understanding requires that a rational relation of shared meaning be established (PFV, 179).

This way of thinking about value as transcendental to praxis, Salazar Bondy says, should change how we conceive of the relationship between value and objectivity. In “Objetividad y valor” (1966; *PFV*, essay 9), Salazar Bondy distinguishes meta-languages and object-languages: a meta-language is constituent of its object-language. Constituent and constituted languages are different: the objects in a constituted, object-language are “not apt to register in the constituent [meta-language]” (*PFV*, 186–7). It is a common mistake, shared by both subjectivist and objectivist accounts of value, Salazar Bondy notes, to think that value is something in a constituted object-language. This is not, however, what value is: “values, or value *in genere*, [are] a constitutional instance of rational human praxis, that is, of a praxis that can be qualified as objective” (*PFV*, 189). In this sense, value is “arche-objective” and what makes objectivity in the world of praxis possible (*PFV*, 189).

2.2 The Evaluative Demand: From *Good* to *Ought*

In this section we will examine Salazar Bondy’s analysis of *good* (*bueno*) and *ought* (*debe*). For Salazar Bondy we use *good* to discuss many different forms of value, including absolute value, relative value, the value of something as a good thing of its kind, and different orders of value (moral, aesthetic, political, etc.). Across these different uses, Salazar Bondy holds there is a consistent structure and essential normative core to any use of *good*. As he explains in “La exigencia estimativa” (1969; *PFV*, essay 4), when someone uses the word *good* they communicate an irreducibly

normative demand or requirement (*exigencia*)⁹ that one *ought* to adopt a favorable attitude regarding whatever is said to be good (*PFV*, 121).¹⁰ Salazar Bondy locates normativity in this *exigencia* (*PFV*, 67).

The *ought* (*debe*) here is *primitive*: it cannot be analyzed into or reduced to anything else. The *ought*, expressed in the form of a demand, shows the *transcendental* aspect of the critical-transcendental framework. The *ought's* normativity is also essential and irreducible: it cannot be reduced to a psychological requirement, non-normative natural necessity, fittingness, or emotive expression (*PFV*, 117). (This is consistent with the Wittgensteinian view that value is not something *in* the world that we can describe propositionally.) Although the *ought* is primitive, it has two characteristics. First, it is unconditional insofar as it does not depend upon an agent's subjective motivations. Second, it is universal: any judgment that 'X is good' aspires to universal validity (for all subjects who would be similarly situated) (*PFV*, 123). In this sense, the *ought* is similar to a Kantian categorical imperative (*PFV*, 123).¹¹ Even 'good for' or 'good relative to' judgments are subject to a kind of universality: they imply that everyone ought to accept the judgment that something is good for someone or relative to something, in distinction to the notion that the judgment is only valid for the person making it.

⁹*Exigencia* can be translated as *demand* or *requirement*. I opt for *demand* because it better captures some of Salazar Bondy's prescriptivist leanings. There are some passages, however, where *requirement* might make for a more natural translation.

¹⁰Salazar Bondy's proposal has some similarity to R.M. Hare's prescriptivism. For Salazar Bondy's overview of Hare, see *PFV*, 311–12, and for some slightly critical remarks, see *PFV*, 115.

¹¹Although Salazar Bondy is influenced by Kant, we do not see him adopting Kant's entire normative ethical theory. Perhaps the closest that he comes is putting some restrictions on valuations if they cannot be universalized.

In “La plurivocidad de ‘bueno’” (1967; PFV, essay 6), Salazar Bondy explains that value has three important components: first, an object of valuation; second, a subject’s experience (*vivencia*) or attitude (*actitud*) (favorable or unfavorable); and third, a demand or requirement (*exigencia*), which links the object to the attitude via an *ought* (PFV, 121, 143). In the most basic case, ‘X is good’ can be translated into a demand expressed in the form of ‘a favorable attitude ought to be taken toward X’ (*Debe tenerse una actitud favorable a X*).¹² This is a template that can be modified depending on the kind of value that is being predicated, but it will always have these three factors. For example, consider a judgment about goodness in reference to an object as the kind of object it is (PFV, 144). When we say ‘That car is a good car’ we: (1) communicate descriptive criteria for what a good car is, and that the car meets it, and (2) express a demand that those criteria and the particular judgment about the car ought to be accepted (PFV, 144–5). This makes reference to a pattern of value for a kind of object (see §2.4).¹³ We can translate statements about something being a good object of its kind, Salazar Bondy says, into a demand: “a favorable attitude with respect to such objects ought to be taken” (PFV, 147).

Likewise, we can translate a sentence that “X is intrinsically good,” Salazar Bondy says, as “a favorable or pro attitude ought to be taken toward the object” (PFV, 148). Salazar Bondy proposes modified translations for other kinds of good, such as relative, extrinsic, and so on. What remains constant across these schemas is the

¹²Salazar Bondy says that there are similar translations available for ‘X es bueno’ (e.g., *Hay que tener una actitud pro X* and *Lo debido es ser favorable a X*) (PFV, 121). Thanks to Santiago Ramos for helpful discussion here.

¹³Notice that Salazar Bondy has dropped his earlier talk about value as the object’s *cumplimiento del ser* here.

demand that one ought to take a favorable attitude with respect to a certain object, although the specific ways that one ought to take a favorable attitude with respect to that object may vary (*PFV*, 153).

This applies as well to judgments about goodness within certain spheres, such as aesthetics, morality, economics, and so on. Consider *morally good*. We can translate “*X* is morally good,” says Salazar Bondy, as the demand that a favorable attitude ought to be taken with respect to a voluntary action (which is, on Salazar Bondy’s view, the sphere of morality) (*PFV*, 156). The particulars of the translation will vary according to the order of value at issue, but, in each case, Salazar Bondy translates the predication of good into a corresponding *ought*-based demand.

Salazar Bondy hopes to show that there is an essential normative core—an *ought*-based demand within the critical-transcendental point of view—to all predications of goodness. The modifications of the translation schema allow him to accommodate different descriptive semantic contents while linking them to this *ought*-based demand.

2.3 The Experience of Value

As in his early philosophy of value, Salazar Bondy continues to hold that any philosophy of value requires an understanding of valuative experience. A theory of value that does not pay sufficient attention to valuative experience, Salazar Bondy remarks, will likely “sink into error and baseless, unsupported, and orphaned speculation” (*PFV*, 47). In “La experiencia del valor” (1967; *PFV*, essay 1), Salazar Bondy distinguishes between two kinds of experience: constative and valuative. Constative

experiences involve perceiving, observing, explaining, and so on, whereas valuative experiences involve “valuing, appreciating, esteeming, preferring, choosing, recommending,” and so on (*PFV*, 50). Phenomenologically, a constative experience is “having or giving an account of what occurs as it occurs, of what is as it is, of what appears as it appears,” and, in this sense, it is neutral (*PFV*, 50). By contrast, in the phenomenology of a valuative experience, “the subject is always in favor or against an object, inclining toward or rejecting it” (*PFV*, 50). The subject has a *commitment* (*compromiso*) in a valuative experience. There are diverse modes of the experience of value, and, for each, there is an implicit demand concerning the judgment of value. In what follows I discuss Salazar Bondy’s four modes of the experience of value—*attribution, realization, preference, and choice*—as a way of explaining how it is that value makes intelligible the world of praxis.

2.3.1 The Attribution of Value

We commonly attribute value to objects, persons, or situations. For Salazar Bondy, this involves making a judgment about that object with a valuative predicate (*PFV*, 56). Attributions of value have two aspects. One is a prescriptive, essentially normative evaluative demand, aims to establish the universality of the valuative judgment. If an attribution of value is to be shareable with other subjects, then they must be able to rationally understand it, and, on this view, they can do so with reference to valuative criteria (*PFV*, 66–8). These criteria are based on patterns of valuation (discussed in Section 2.4). For example, when I say ‘that is a good house’ I make a judgment with reference to the criteria for houses (e.g., providing adequate shelter)

that are established in a pattern of valuation concerning houses, and I (implicitly) demand such a judgment be universal.

Attributions of value can be true or false. One way that an attribution of value can be false is by being mistaken about the facts about the object in question. Another way is for the subject to be mistaken about the adequacy of the valuative criteria. The latter is called a primary or properly valuative error (*PFV*, 58). These errors can occur when a subject knows the descriptive characteristics of an object but has applied valuative criteria that the subject does not recognize as genuinely valuable. For example, subjects may be coerced into applying valuative criteria that they do not recognize as legitimate.

Salazar Bondy identifies three kinds of errors in attributions of value: illusion, counterfeiting, and mystification (*PFV*, 58). Illusion involves something (e.g., psychological factors) causing a subject to make a spontaneous initial judgment that is incorrect (*PFV*, 58). Counterfeiting occurs when the object of a judgment is a fake or a substitute. However, as Salazar Bondy points out, it is possible for a subject to be aware of counterfeiting: I can be aware that an object is a counterfeit but judge that it still has some degree of value (*PFV*, 59). Mystification, like counterfeiting, involves the substitution of one object for another. However, unlike counterfeiting, the subject is not aware of the substitution and is thus mystified about its nature. For example, Salazar Bondy claims that commercials mystify by associating mundane, mediocre products with other values (e.g., prestige), leading a consumer to buy the product because of the associated value, even though they do not value the product (*PFV*, 59).

2.3.2 The Realization of Value

Based on attributions of value, we can *realize* values. To realize a value is for a subject to translate an attribution of value into reality through an intervention in the world (PFV, 69). Realization of value can be proper or improper. A proper realization of value is undertaken through a “conscious and voluntary decision” (PFV, 72). While an attribution of value begins with the actual state of an object and then predicates value or disvalue to it, a proper realization of value requires considering how the world could be with reference to value and to intervene on that basis. An improper realization of value does not have this voluntary element of decision.

Unlike attributions of value, realizations of value are neither true nor false but rather *authentic* or *inauthentic*. In his essay “La cultura de dominación” (1966) (reprinted in *Dominación y liberación* [1995]; works in this volume are henceforth cited with *DL*), Salazar Bondy says that a way of being or acting is “inauthentic when the action does not correspond to a principle recognized and validated by the subject” (*DL*, 70). For example, consider someone who easily forges paintings in styles they dislike but that are easy to sell fraudulently at inflated prices: their realization of value (the creation of a painting) would be inauthentic. In an authentic realization of value, the subject does recognize the validity of the value realized in their actions. For example, suppose that I genuinely value a particular aesthetic style and I create a painting based on it in order to appreciate its beauty: this would be an authentic realization of value.

2.3.3 Preference

Preferring involves “an act or experience of comparative appreciation of the degrees of value with reference to two or more [objects]” in which one of those objects is valued more (*PFV*, 73). There are four factors involved in preferring. First, we are aware of which properties the objects have in common. Second, we refer to a *valuation pattern* containing these properties. Third, we make a comparison of the objects on the basis of that pattern. This leads to a factual-axiological determination of which of the objects is preferable (*PFV*, 80–1). Out of these preferences, Salazar Bondy notes, we can establish hierarchies of value.¹⁴

Salazar Bondy is careful to distinguish preference from mere likes and dislikes. A judgment of preference involves comparative attributions of value, which can themselves be true or false. It implies that one object is *worthy* of being preferred. Like with an attribution of value, there is an implicit normative demand: others *ought* to recognize the truth of the preference in an objective sense. Mere likes and dislikes, or preference in a *weak* sense, do not involve this implicit normative demand.

2.3.4 Valuative Choice

A valuative choice for Salazar Bondy combines the three prior categories. A choice is a voluntary decision to realize a value (and not to realize others) through action, on the basis of a preference ordering (which, recall, incorporates attributions of value)

¹⁴One difference with Salazar Bondy’s earlier theory is that he no longer discusses value orderings on the basis of *cumplimiento del ser* but rather preferences and valuation patterns (see Section 2.4).

(*PFV*, 84). Salazar Bondy notes that although the realization of values and choice may appear similar, they are not identical. Choice involves a *voluntary decision* to realize a value through a course of action while discarding other possibilities judged to be less valuable. The realization of value itself does not, on this view, necessarily require a voluntary decision (although it does in the strong sense). There can be authentic and inauthentic choices, such as when one chooses to realize a value, even though that is contrary to one's preference.

However, how does one choose when values conflict? In Salazar Bondy's early philosophy of value, his answer was that we choose in a way that realizes the human being's *cumplimiento del ser*, and, more generally, *cumplimiento del ser* as such. But because Salazar Bondy has discarded his ontological perspective he cannot rely on that answer here. To understand Salazar Bondy's response to this question it will be helpful to discuss his account of patterns of valuation.

2.4 Patterns of Valuation

Patterns of valuation are an essential component of all of these experiences of value: attribution, realization, preference, and choice. Salazar Bondy separates these patterns of valuation into two main kinds: secondary, or derived, patterns of valuation and primary or original patterns of valuation, also called *protovaluations* (*PFV*, 91). A third kind, a critical valuation, stands as an intermediary between them.

Derived or secondary valuations are based on an already existing pattern of value (*PFV*, 91, 197–8). There are three classes of derived valuations: learned, transferred,

and imitated. Learned derived valuations involve the “conscious and deliberate acceptance of a pattern of valuation” (*PFV*, 92). For example, I may learn to value art with reference to rules of composition that I learn in art class. Transferred derived valuations involve an acceptance of a pattern of valuation, but that acceptance is not conscious or deliberately made. For instance, suppose that some standard of beauty is ubiquitous in society and I come implicitly to adopt this standard as my own, even though I have never explicitly considered it. Imitated derived valuations are ones that are accepted deliberately but not with conviction (*PFV*, 92–3). For example, I may learn to imitate the valuation patterns of a sommelier not because I like wine but because I want to project the prestigious social status of a connoisseur of luxury goods.

Protovaluations are not based on an already existing pattern of value, and they issue spontaneously from the subject. Examples of these would be artistic or moral revolutions (*PFV*, 93). Protovaluations are *free* or *formulated*. A formulated protovaluation is formed intentionally with the aim of ‘establishing a new norm of valuation’ (such as organizers who attempt to change our moral concepts). A free protovaluation is not formed with the explicit intention of establishing a new norm (although it may incidentally do so later if it receives uptake from others) (*PFV*, 94).¹⁵ The will, Salazar Bondy claims, is central in establishing protovaluations (*PFV*, 94–5). As we will see in Section 3, Salazar Bondy holds that domination involves

¹⁵One worry about formulated protovaluations is how, if they are indeed formulated, they could be formulated without reference to existing patterns of valuation. This is because value is supposed to be what makes objects of praxis—such as actions, choices, and ends—intelligible, but, without these, it’s not clear how one could deliberately or intentionally make a choice to form a protovaluation.

that the dominator have the power of decision over the will of the dominated. If this is right, then protovaluations are those in which domination is absent or rejected in a moment of liberation. Between these derived and protovaluations are critical valuations. These valuations combine aspects of derived valuations, insofar as they work with an existing pattern, and protovaluations, insofar as they introduce an original revision to the preexisting pattern.

Because protovaluations and critical evaluations do not rely on existing valuations, one might worry that they are arbitrary or groundless. To make matters worse, if all derived valuations are based on protovaluations then all derived valuations are based on arbitrary acceptances of those protovaluations. Thus it seems that it would be impossible to choose non-arbitrarily between conflicting patterns of valuation.

In “La dificultad de elegir” (1967; *PFV*, essay 10), Salazar Bondy considers how to solve this challenging problem. He rejects a correspondence between a pattern of value and independent values as natural or non-natural entities or properties. He also rejects the idea of simply accepting arbitrariness for original patterns of valuation and then saying that normal choices, insofar as they make reference to these patterns and the patterns do not conflict, are non-arbitrary. Salazar Bondy thinks that this proposed solution is unsatisfactory: when we encounter a conflict between patterns of value or are concerned about the arbitrariness of our choices, it *does* seem in ordinary praxis that these two levels conflict (*PFV*, 198–9).

One option he sees as more promising is returning to the critical-transcendental point of view and the evaluative demand (*PFV*, 199–204). First, as we saw earlier, the will is a crucial part of what makes value and ethics transcendental for Salazar Bondy.

If a will is not free then it cannot be a genuine protovaluation. Second, whenever we make a valuative judgment (or attribution, choice, etc.) we are implicitly endorsing an unconditional and universalizable evaluative demand that others would rationally accept. In a Kantian way, Salazar Bondy notes, these necessary features of the evaluative demand, such as universalizability, may serve as the grounds for establishing the non-arbitrariness of protovaluations or at least ruling some of them out as unsatisfactory.

3 Value, Domination, Liberation, and Philosophy

In the third stage of his philosophical development, Salazar Bondy focuses on questions of domination, liberation, and the role of philosophy in Latin America. This period of his philosophy has attracted the most attention from Anglophone philosophers. In this section I will take up Salazar Bondy's philosophy of domination and liberation and his view of the role of philosophy in Latin American in relation to his philosophy of value. Understanding Salazar Bondy's philosophy of value can deepen and enrich our understanding of these topics. To show this I will call attention to four aspects of his philosophy of value: patterns of valuation, the experience of value, the critical-transcendental framework, and the evaluative demand.

3.1 Domination, Liberation, and Philosophy

Salazar Bondy characterizes domination as a relation between two entities where the dominator has a *power of decision* over the dominated (*DL*, 153). This power, Salazar Bondy says in “Dominación, valores y formación humana” (1972; *DL*, 141–152), “permits [the dominator] to decide on the life of the other . . . to put [the dominated] at [the dominator’s] own disposition; therefore annexing them and, by annexing them, taking from them a little of their being” (*DL*, 147). On Salazar Bondy’s view, domination occurs between individuals, groups, classes, and even countries and economies. This was, he thought, the situation of Peru, both externally (in relation to colonial and imperial powers and economies) and internally (between different classes and groups) (*DL*, 126).¹⁶ Out of this domination, Salazar Bondy argued, can grow a *culture of domination*. A culture of domination involves “values, attitudes, and structures of behavior” as well as “the systems that frame [the culture’s] life and do not let it expand and bear fruit” (*DL*, 84–5). This culture is marked by underdevelopment, mystification, alienation, superficial imitation, and inauthenticity (*DL*, 123–40).¹⁷

Philosophy, as a part of culture, can also reflect and reinforce a culture of domination. Philosophers in Latin America had, as Salazar Bondy argues in *¿Existe filosofía en nuestra América?* (*EFNA*), learned to imitate the patterns of European philosophy through the long history of colonialism in Latin America. This stunted their philosophical growth and originality. It was primarily an inauthentic cultural

¹⁶Salazar Bondy’s analysis of domination and liberation draws on the insights of Marxism and dependency theory. For a good overview of Salazar Bondy’s debt to Marxism, see Llorente (2010, 172–5).

¹⁷See also Sobrevilla (1995, 26).

product that failed to respond to the historically situated needs of Latin America:¹⁸

Hispano-American philosophy sanctions, then, the use of foreign and inadequate patterns, and sanctions it in a double sense derived from the ambivalence of our existence, namely: as conscious assumption of concepts and norms without roots in our historical-existential condition, and as an imitative product, without originality and without power that, instead of creating, repeats a foreign thought. (*EFNA*, 85)

For Salazar Bondy, philosophy is, as Ofelia Schutte puts it, a form of reasoning that is “rooted in the life of the community,” but, if the life of that community is deformed or distorted by domination, philosophy will “fail to correspond to the needs of the community (or communities) making it up” (Schutte 1993, 97–8). Although Latin American philosophy had yet to be authentic, Salazar Bondy was nevertheless optimistic about its potential: he remarked that, unlike Hegel’s owl of Minerva taking off at dusk, philosophy in Latin America has the opportunity to be “the messenger of dawn, the beginning of a historical change by a radical awareness of an existence projected into the future” (*EFNA*, 89).

3.2 Value, Domination, and Liberation

For Salazar Bondy, “certain values . . . translate, affirm, and consolidate domination” (*DL*, 150). But domination could not, he thought, have any meaning without the

¹⁸This was the central point of controversy in Salazar Bondy’s debate with Leopoldo Zea. See Schutte (1993, chap. 3).

possibility of liberation: “what gives meaning to domination is that man can be more or less, can succeed or fail, can lose his being or be free” (*DL*, 150). There are four areas of Salazar Bondy’s philosophy of value that can deepen our understanding of his account of domination and liberation: patterns of valuation, the experience of value, the critical-transcendental framework, and the evaluative demand.

3.2.1 Patterns of Valuation

The dichotomy between domination and liberation can be seen in relation to patterns of valuation. We can recall that Salazar Bondy distinguishes between three kinds of patterns of valuation: derived, critical, and proto (or original). Derived patterns of valuation and derived valuations are based on an existing pattern of value. They can be learned, transferred, or imitated. On Salazar Bondy’s view, Latin America’s condition of domination was marked by how its culture and its possibilities for action were structured by derived patterns of valuation. These were, on Salazar Bondy’s view, often transferred, sometimes violently, through relations of domination, such as when a colonizing power imposes a racial, economic, cultural, or religious value pattern through coercive activity, or nonviolently through learning or imitation. The result of these imposed patterns of valuation, on Salazar Bondy’s view, is alienation: “to say that the Peruvian is an alienated being is to say that he thinks, feels, acts according to norms, standards and values that are alien to him” (*DL*, 79). This was, in Salazar Bondy’s view, what happened to Latin American philosophy.

Although derived patterns of valuation may reinforce domination, Salazar Bondy’s philosophy also shows us how liberation may be possible. Critical val-

uations may take up part of a derived pattern of valuation but reject or modify another aspect of it. If a derived pattern of valuation reinforces domination, only in a partial way, then a critical revision of that pattern may serve an appropriate liberatory function. On Salazar Bondy's view, one of the most important functions of Latin American philosophy was precisely this critical task. Salazar Bondy calls for Latin American philosophy to engage in "a cancellation of prejudices, myths, idols" and to "unveil our subjection as peoples and our depression as human beings" (*EFNA*, 90).

Protovaluations (whether free or formulated) are not derived from any pre-existing pattern of valuation and issue from the subject's spontaneity. Although protovaluations are not based on previously established patterns of valuation, they nonetheless may be responsive to the sociohistorical location in which the subjects formulate them and serve a liberatory function. Because value is a condition for human action and interaction, protovaluations may allow for radical reconfigurations in possibilities for human action and interaction. Here I think we can see the positive role of philosophy: it provides us with the conceptual resources that can be used to formulate new protovaluations, and this may help to explain what has been called Salazar Bondy's "surprising optimism concerning the potential of philosophy to dispel domination" (Llorente 2010, 173).

3.2.2 The Experience of Value

For Salazar Bondy, as we saw, there are four modes of the experience of value: attribution, realization, preference, and choice. Attributions of value, as we saw, can

be true or false. False attributions of value may be due to simple factual errors, or they may be due to deeper errors, such as illusion, counterfeiting, and mystification. Consider, for example, the ideologies that the colonizer imposes on the colonized about the inferiority of the colonized. These judgments may, after extensive social control, come to be internalized by the colonized. This could lead the colonized to make incorrect judgments about their own value. As another kind of case, consider mystification. Mystification occurs when a subject thinks that they value an object other than the one that they in fact value. Salazar Bondy gives the example of indigenous religious beliefs. Indigenous communities in Peru, he notes, have a set of beliefs that they may take to be Catholic yet, in actual fact, they are sufficiently different from Catholicism to effectively “have lost [Catholicism’s] original substance” (*DL*, 71). If these communities think that they value Catholicism, rather than their own indigenous religious beliefs and practices, they would be *mystified*. Such mystification would affirm and consolidate colonial domination.

Salazar Bondy’s account of the realization of value and of choice can also help to explain how values can reinforce domination. Recall that choices and realizations of value are either authentic or inauthentic. An inauthentic choice or realization of value is when an action is based upon a value whose validity is not recognized by the subject, such as when subjects act on values begrudgingly owing to inequalities of power, or they act because of mystified attributions or preferences (*DL*, 70). Remember that, for Salazar Bondy, domination is a structural relation in which the dominator has the *power of choice* over the dominated. Insofar as it is the dominator who chooses what the dominated will do, the dominated’s choices will tend to be

inauthentic: they will be based on the choices and principles of the dominator. To the degree that the dominator has convinced the dominated to take those values or principles as their own, the dominated make mystified attributions of value and inauthentic choices.

3.2.3 The Critical-Transcendental Framework and the Evaluative Demand

Value is, on Salazar Bondy's view, transcendental to human action. Values are what allow us to understand (and be understood) and hold others accountable (and be held accountable ourselves) in their interactions with us. Given that value structures the world of praxis, domination through values runs deep. Salazar Bondy's account can help us to understand just how constraining domination via values can be. Yet, at the same time, Salazar Bondy's project may nonetheless give us hope for liberation through the critical power of philosophy or through the creation of new protovaluations. In addition to criticism and protovaluations, Salazar Bondy's critical-transcendental framework can provide resources for liberation through its requirements on rationality and on the evaluative demand.

In "Dominación, valores y formación humana" (1972; *DL*, 141–52), Salazar Bondy reminds us that values, in constituting the world of praxis, "attempt to ground the rationality of human coexistence" and this, in turn, implies "the idea of a dialogue in which all converge" (*DL*, 145). However, the relationship of dominator—dominated is one that does not aim at the rationality of coexistence or at a dialogue in which all converge. The critical-transcendental viewpoint, then, can explain what's gone wrong when a dominator attempts to impose values that are irrational, that fail to

secure human coexistence, or that undermine rational dialogue. In this way, as Gian Franco Sandoval Mendoza puts it, values “are the guarantees of all practical rationality” (Sandoval Mendoza 2014, 122). For any judgment of value, a subject is committed to an evaluative demand, which aims to be universal. However, domination precludes universality because the dominated lack the power of decision to determine their own lives. Patterns of valuation, then, which aim to secure domination cannot be universalized. In his philosophical dialogue *Bartolomé o de la dominación* (1974; *DL*, 191–264), Salazar Bondy makes this point clear in the remarks of the character Hatuey (who is deeply critical of the *conquista*):¹⁹

Universalization is impossible and rationality will not be complete if the order achieved within a nation cannot be extended to all the earth, so that there are no countries dominated or dominating, miserable and opulent countries, servant nations and owners of the world who can condemn a people to hunger, blocking their territory, cutting it off from the rest of the earth, like this island. (*DL*, 254)

Here we see the synthesis of Salazar Bondy’s sophisticated philosophy of value with his urgent historical critique of domination in Latin America. The last line of *Bartolomé* illustrates Salazar Bondy’s optimism for a better tomorrow: “The present is a struggle, the future is ours. ¡Venceremos!” (*DL*, 264).

¹⁹For a more detailed analysis of *Bartolomé*, see Sandoval Mendoza (2014, 122).

4 Closing Remarks

In this chapter I have offered an account of Salazar Bondy's philosophy of value over the three stages of his career. First, we examined Salazar Bondy's early philosophy of value as *cumplimiento del ser* and his reasons for leaving it behind. Second, we explored Salazar Bondy's mature philosophy of value, and we saw how he argued how value makes the world of praxis possible via his detailed analysis of the experience of value. Third, we examined how understanding Salazar Bondy's philosophy of value can add significant interpretative depth to his accounts of domination, liberation, and the role of philosophy in Latin America.

With Salazar Bondy's account now on the table, we may wonder whether or not it can still be relevant for us today. Are there any lessons that we, as contemporary philosophers, may now take from Salazar Bondy's philosophy of value? To close, I want to briefly sketch out some possibilities for further potential comparative inquiry with contemporary metaethics and Salazar Bondy's continuing relevance.

Salazar Bondy's nuanced account of the relationship between value and human action may add a new perspective to contemporary treatments of this topic. For example, in *The Practice of Value* (2003), Joseph Raz argues for a tight connection between values and social practices: "with some exceptions," Raz claims, "all values depend on social practices" (19). Salazar Bondy, like Raz, holds that there are dependency relations between values and social practices. Salazar Bondy emphasizes that a dependency relation can also run in the other direction as well: practices can depend on values insofar as values are transcendental to practices and render them

intelligible as objects of praxis. This is not to say that Salazar Bondy would disagree with Raz's view that practices sustain values (he wouldn't), but rather that Salazar Bondy's view can highlight a different kind of dependence that practices have on values, resulting in a fuller picture of the relationship between the two.

As another example, consider Kate Manne's view of social practices in metaethics (2013). Manne, like Salazar Bondy, is not fully satisfied with either objectivist or subjectivist accounts in metaethics (50–1), and, again like Salazar Bondy, she holds that there is another, underexplored metaethical perspective arising "from facts about what we do, or about what one does, as a participant in certain sorts of collective practices, joint enterprises, or particular social relationships" (51–2). Both Manne and Salazar Bondy are also interested in determining how to validate certain social practices while ruling out others, especially oppressive ones. However, despite these similarities, there remain important differences between the two. For example, Salazar Bondy, we can recall, endorses a transcendental perspective and Kantian-style universalizability requirement on the evaluative demand; by contrast, Manne opts for a flourishing-based view and eschews transcendental or universalizability approaches to the validity of practices. There is not space here, of course, to adjudicate these differences, but I simply want to suggest that Salazar Bondy's mature philosophy of value can be put into dialogue with cutting-edge work in metaethics and that the result may be a productive friction.

Finally, I want to close with a more general metaphilosophical observation. In the second and third periods of Salazar Bondy's philosophical career we see an excellent example of a philosopher who combines analytical clarity, rigor, and

nuance with an abiding concern for the pressing social and political issues of his time. We can observe how Salazar Bondy uses the tools and distinctions he developed in his philosophy of value to analyze the problems of domination facing Latin America. Salazar Bondy was optimistic that philosophy, by developing authentic concepts, could contribute to the struggle for social, political, economic, and cultural liberation. While this is common in applied ethics, normative ethics, and political philosophy, it remains less common in more abstract subfields of philosophy such as metaethics. This is not to say that we should instrumentalize metaethics for purely political purposes but rather to suggest that, where appropriate, the conceptual tools that we use and develop may inform (and be informed by) our responses to difficult social and political problems, as they did for Salazar Bondy.

References

- Arpini, Adriana María. 2008. "Valor y experiencia valorativa en los escritos de Augusto Salazar Bondy: Momentos de su reflexión axiológica." *Solar* 4: 157–203.
- Arpini, Adriana María. 2016. *Filosofía, crítica y compromiso en Augusto Salazar Bondy*. Lima: Fondo Editorial del Congreso del Perú.
- Hare, R. M. 1952. *The Language of Morals*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Llorente, Renzo. 2010. "Marxism." In *A Companion to Latin American Philosophy*, edited by Susana Nuccetelli, Ofelia Schutte, and Otávio Bueno, 170–84. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Manne, Kate. 2013. "On Being Social in Metaethics." In *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, Vol. 8, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, 50–73. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Miró Quesada, Francisco. (1974) 2015. "Augusto Salazar Bondy: Biografía filosófica." *El Peruano*, September 8, 2015.
- Moore, G. E. (1903) 1993. *Principia Ethica*, edited by Thomas Baldwin. Revised ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Navarro Reyes, Jesús. 2010. "Estudio crítico introductorio: La axiología de Augusto Salazar Bondy." In *Para una filosofía del valor*, 9–36. Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Económica de España.
- Ørvig, Helen. 1995. "Prólogo." In *Dominación y liberación*, edited by Ørvig Helen and David Sobrevilla, 11–14. Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Facultad de Letras y Ciencias Humanas Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos.
- Quiroz Avila, Rubén, ed. 2014. *Actas de Congreso sobre Augusto Salazar Bondy*. Lima: Instituto de Investigación del Pensamiento Peruano y Latinoamericano.
- Raz, Joseph. 2003. *The Practice of Value*, edited and with an introduction by R. Jay Wallace. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Salazar Bondy, Augusto. 1958. *Irrealidad e idealidad [II]*. Lima: Universidad Na-

cional Mayor de San Marcos.

- . (1959) 2010. “La jerarquía axiológica.” In *Para una filosofía del valor*, 205–218.
- . (1959) 2010. “Valor y objeto en estética.” In *Para una filosofía del valor*, 221–227.
- . (1965) 2010. “El problema del valor en el primer Wittgenstein: A propósito de *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, *4-6.421.” In *Para una filosofía del valor*, 257–270.
- . (1965) 2010. “Una hipótesis sobre el sentido valorativo.” In *Para una filosofía del valor*, 112–120.
- . (1966) 1995. “La cultura de dominación” In *Dominación y liberación*, 69–94.
- . (1966) 2010. “Objetividad y valor.” In *Para una filosofía del valor*, 182–190.
- . (1967) 2010. “La dificultad de elegir.” In *Para una filosofía del valor*, 191–204.
- . (1967) 2010. “La experiencia del valor.” In *Para una filosofía del valor*, 47–97.
- . (1967) 2010. “La plurivocidad de ‘bueno.’” In *Para una filosofía del valor*, 139–162.
- . (1968) 2006. *¿Existe una filosofía de nuestra América? [EFNA]*, 17th ed. Mexico, DF: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.
- . (1968) 2010. “Razón y valor: El problema de la fundamentación en el debate axiológico.” In *Para una filosofía del valor*, 174–181.
- . (1969) 2010. “La exigencia estimativa.” In *Para una filosofía del valor*, 121–136.
- . (1971) 2010. *Para una filosofía del valor [PFV]*, 2nd ed., edited and with an introduction by Jesús Navarro Reyes. Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Económica de España.
- . (1972) 1995. “Cultura y dominación.” In *Dominación y liberación*, 123–140
- . (1972) 1995. “Dominación, valores y formación humana.” In *Dominación y*

liberación, 141–152

———. (1973) 1995. “Filosofía de la dominación y de la liberación.” In *Dominación y liberación*, 153–158

———. (1974) 1995. *Bartolomé o la dominación*. In *Dominación y liberación*, 191–264

———. 1995. *Dominación y liberación: Escritos 1966–1974 [DL]*, edited by Helen Ørvg and David Sobrevilla. Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Facultad de Letras y Ciencias Humanas Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos.

Sandoval Mendoza, Gian Franco. 2014. “Niveles de la vida valorativa y la superación de la estructura de la dominación en Augusto Salazar Bondy.” In *Actas del Congreso sobre Augusto Salazar Bondy*, edited by Rubén Quiroz Avila, 115–26. Lima: Instituto de Investigación del Pensamiento Peruano y Latinoamericano.

Schutte, Ofelia. 1993. *Cultural Identity and Social Liberation in Latin American Thought*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Sobrevilla, David. 1995. “Introducción: Los escritos de Augusto Salazar Bondy sobre dominación y liberación.” In *Dominación y liberación*, edited by Helen Ørvg and David Sobrevilla, 15–64. Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Facultad de Letras y Ciencias Humanas Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1921) 2001. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [T]*, translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. New York: Routledge.